That you bring all this knowledge to bear on our subject, and that you do so twice a week to a deadline, with such generosity, is a constant marvel. Thank you so much.
Sinclair says this is the most prosaic of the cantos in the Inferno, “being little more than a verbal diagram.”
But as you note, that “verbal diagram” is an important point of reflection since it affords the opportunity to acquire an overarching view of the logic and structure of Hell.
For me, Dante’s “orientation” of Aristotle and Cicero’s conceptions brought to mind the famous strategist Karl von Clausewitz’s description of war’s “logic and grammar” in his treatise “Vom Kriege” (On War). One would think war and Hell are unbounded extremes, but quite the opposite is true — both are characterized by their own “logic and grammar.” Clausewitz saw that while war has “its [own] particular rules and its basic principles,” it does not have its own logic; that is provided by policy (the set of rules [imperatives, principles and customs] that govern reasoning in the use of war as an instrument of policy). War does have its own grammar (the collection of rules and procedures employed by a military force to achieve the ends established by policy).
One could similarly argue that the“logic” Dante applies to Hell is not Hell’s to make — it comes from the ultimate policy-maker — in the form of divine justice. Dante’s “grammar” derives from the application of Aristotle and Cicero’s characterization, hierarchy, and classification of sin.
Speaking of “verbal diagrams,” both Dante and Clausewitz reflect mastery of linguistics and how to express their unique view of their respective worlds, which is why one line in Canto XI struck me as extraordinarily interesting: “…fraud is man’s peculiar vice.”
My first reaction was “Of course it’s peculiar to man, animals can’t sin!” After all, the concept of good and evil does not adhere to animals; they lack rational souls and free will; they cannot form intent; they are not capable of moral corruption, therefore they cannot be held morally responsible. Sin requires a conscious and deliberate turning away from God — since animals are governed by instinct, they do not possess the capacity to “turn away.” What is “peculiar” about fraud then, I would argue, is, as you note, what Aristotle said was the essence of the human being: “zoon logon echon” — the human is the animal with language. By it, he described man’s ability to use logos (reason/speech) to think, deliberate, communicate, and engage in moral decision-making. Language and reason, ill-employed, can deliberately distort “logic and grammar” in order to commit fraud. Very peculiar to man, indeed.
That you bring all this knowledge to bear on our subject, and that you do so twice a week to a deadline, with such generosity, is a constant marvel. Thank you so much.
I concur. Though I don't offer much in the chats, I am extremely grateful for what you make available to us .
I third both of these comments. I am consistently blown away by this work.
Sinclair says this is the most prosaic of the cantos in the Inferno, “being little more than a verbal diagram.”
But as you note, that “verbal diagram” is an important point of reflection since it affords the opportunity to acquire an overarching view of the logic and structure of Hell.
For me, Dante’s “orientation” of Aristotle and Cicero’s conceptions brought to mind the famous strategist Karl von Clausewitz’s description of war’s “logic and grammar” in his treatise “Vom Kriege” (On War). One would think war and Hell are unbounded extremes, but quite the opposite is true — both are characterized by their own “logic and grammar.” Clausewitz saw that while war has “its [own] particular rules and its basic principles,” it does not have its own logic; that is provided by policy (the set of rules [imperatives, principles and customs] that govern reasoning in the use of war as an instrument of policy). War does have its own grammar (the collection of rules and procedures employed by a military force to achieve the ends established by policy).
One could similarly argue that the“logic” Dante applies to Hell is not Hell’s to make — it comes from the ultimate policy-maker — in the form of divine justice. Dante’s “grammar” derives from the application of Aristotle and Cicero’s characterization, hierarchy, and classification of sin.
Speaking of “verbal diagrams,” both Dante and Clausewitz reflect mastery of linguistics and how to express their unique view of their respective worlds, which is why one line in Canto XI struck me as extraordinarily interesting: “…fraud is man’s peculiar vice.”
My first reaction was “Of course it’s peculiar to man, animals can’t sin!” After all, the concept of good and evil does not adhere to animals; they lack rational souls and free will; they cannot form intent; they are not capable of moral corruption, therefore they cannot be held morally responsible. Sin requires a conscious and deliberate turning away from God — since animals are governed by instinct, they do not possess the capacity to “turn away.” What is “peculiar” about fraud then, I would argue, is, as you note, what Aristotle said was the essence of the human being: “zoon logon echon” — the human is the animal with language. By it, he described man’s ability to use logos (reason/speech) to think, deliberate, communicate, and engage in moral decision-making. Language and reason, ill-employed, can deliberately distort “logic and grammar” in order to commit fraud. Very peculiar to man, indeed.